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RESPONSIVE REGULATION, RISK, AND RULES:
APPLYING THE THEORY TO TAX PRACTICE
JUDITH FREEDMAN'
I. INTRODUCTION
John Braithwaite's seminal work on responsive regulation' has been taken up
and developed by tax authorities around the world.' It has had a major im-
pact on methods of tax administration. The Braithwaite model, with its en-
forcement strategy and regulatory sanctions pyramid,' has much to offer in a
t Professor of Tax Law, University of Oxford; Director of Legal Research, Oxford Univer-
sity Centre for Business Taxation (OUCBT). The author would like to thankJohn Vella
and Geoffrey Loomer, Research Fellows at OUCBT, researchers and co-authors of the
empirical work referred to in this article for that work and for their comments on the arti-
cle, and also the anonymous referees for their comments. This work has been supported
by OUCBT and particularly the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) large
grant (RES-060-25-0033), which is gratefully acknowledged. She also thanks the partici-
pants at the Responsive Regulation Workshop at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, Van-
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Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation De-
bate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); John Braithwaite, "The Essence of Re-
sponsive Regulation" (2011) 44:3 UBC L Rev 475 [Braithwaite, "Essence"]. See also
John Braithwaite, Markets in Vice, Markets in Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005) [Braithwaite, Markets]; Valerie Braithwaite, ed, TaxingDemocracy: Understanding
Tax Avoidance andEvasion (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003) [Braithwaite,Democracy] (apply-
ing these ideas in tax writings).
2 Kristina Murphy, "Moving Forward Towards a More Effective Model of Regulatory En-
forcement in the Australian Tax Office" (2004) 24:6 British Tax Review 603.
This was introduced in John Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal
Mine Safety (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985) and then developed in
Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 1.
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tax context. This strategy works by relying on self-regulation or attempting
to coax compliance by persuasion initially, which will work with the major-
ity, and then moving on to greater levels of enforcement culminating in
criminal penalties for the most recalcitrant minority at the tip of the pyra-
mid.4 This approach has some limitations and difficulties, however, and its
application in the tax world could be strengthened by recognition of its
weaknesses and the implementation of action to address these problems.
Some critics argue that there is an inherent constitutional problem with
responsive regulation.' These concerns are of a general nature, but have par-
ticular strength in the tax field, in view of the constitutional and political
sensitivity surrounding tax-raising powers and as a result of the complexity
and relative indeterminacy of tax law, which may make it more difficult than
in other areas to assess what constitutes compliance in every case.' To some
extent the limitations relate to the way in which the model is applied, but
there are also more fundamental objections that require examination. This
article discusses two particular problems, together with possible responses,
which could help to appease the critics of responsive regulation in the tax
arena. Part II describes these problems and sets out the challenges posed by
responsive regulation to tax administration. Part III discusses these issues
further, in the context of changing relationships between revenue authorities
and large businesses, using a case study based on the approach of Her Maj-
esty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in the UK in this area. Part IV dis-
cusses the issues raised by the example in the context of some of the respon-
sive regulation literature and Part V concludes by suggesting that the theory
of responsive regulation has great value in tax administration but also the
potential for misfiring in this area unless applied and used only where appro-
See especially Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note I at 35-40.
See e.g. Jan Freigang, "Scrutiny: Is Responsive Regulation Compatible with the Rule of
Law?" (2002) 8:4 European Public Law 463; Karen Yeung, Securing Compliance:APrin-
cipledApproach (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) at 170, 248.
6 See Mark Burton, "Responsive Regulation and the Uncertainty of Tax Law: Time to
Reconsider the Commissioner's Model ofCooperative Compliance?" (2007) 5:1 eJournal
of Tax Research 71. Critics have made similar comments in connection with other areas
of law, however, for example criminal law. See Andrew Ashworth, 'Is the criminal law a
lost cause?" (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 225.
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priate legal safeguards are provided. Legally enforceable safeguards are re-
quired to maintain the rule of law and provide a clear framework of objec-
tives, due to the sensitivity of taxation and the complex relationship between
citizen and taxpayer. The phrase "rule of law" is used here in its formal rather
than its substantive sense to mean that government should govern by known
rules and that the law must be capable of guiding the behaviour of its sub-
jects.7 This is not inconsistent with a theoretical approach that rests upon
mutual trust but can provide an appropriate background for a relationship of
trust.
An adherence to the rule of law does not mean that we must stick to the
old cat-and-mouse game of detailed legislation, which often provides oppor-
tunities for taxpayers and their advisers to find ways of subverting that very
legislation-the game of "creative compliance".' The answer does not lie in
rigid detailed legislation, literally interpreted; indeed, this is not the way
most modern legal systems work, even in the tax area. It may be essential to
leave some discretion in the hands of the tax authorities and the courts, but
this must be bounded discretion. Building trust and involving interest groups
in "regulatory conversations"' are important parts of the answer, but in a tax
context this must be supported by legal structures and be subject to adminis-
trative safeguards or it will not be perceived by taxpayers to be fair, in which
case responsive regulation will fail.'o
SSee Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study ofthe Law ofthe Constitution (London:
Macmillan, 1885); Joseph Raz, The Authority ofLaw: Essays on Law and Morality, 2d ed
(Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2009) at ch 11. See also Paul Craig, "Formal and sub-
stantive conceptions of the rule of law: an analytical framework" [1997] PL 467 (for fur-
ther discussion and references).
8 See Doreen McBarnet & Christopher Whelan, "The elusive spirit of the law: formalism
and the struggle for legal control" (1991) 54:6 Mod L Rev 848.
9 Julia Black, Rules andRegulators (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) [Black, Rules]. See also
John Braithwaite, "Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty" (2002) 27 Austra-
lianJournal of Legal Philosophy 47 [Braithwaite, "Legal Certainty"] (developing the term
in a tax context).
1o Valerie Braithwaite, "Dancing with Tax Authorities: Motivational Postures and Non-
complaint Actions" in Braithwaite, Democracy, supra note 1 at 15 [Braithwaite, "Danc-
ing"].
629
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If tax law cannot be certain (and it is unlikely that it can be) then it must
at least be ascertainable within an equitable system." This may be better
achieved through a system based on principles than on one attempting the
futile aim of achieving comprehensive rules.12 The use ofsome discretion will
always be necessary; the consequences for taxpayers who disagree with inter-
pretations and applications made by revenue authorities need to be as limited
as possible, transparent, and open to scrutiny and challenge.
II. TAX AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION: APPLICATION
AND CHALLENGES
As would be expected by those familiar with the general theory of responsive
regulation, the compliance pyramid as applied in a tax context seeks to select
an enforcement strategy that reflects the behaviour of the taxpayer." As ap-
plied to the tax area, the enforcement pyramid works on the basis that most
taxpayers voluntarily comply with the tax system. Many more can be regu-
lated by way of persuasion in the context of co-operation and trust, for ex-
ample by the authorities giving advice where a taxpayer is confused, rather
than instantly charging a penalty. 4 These compliant taxpayers form the ma-
jority, at the base of the pyramid. The taxpayers at the tip of the pyramid are
those who are engaged in tax evasion and they must be dealt with by way of
deterrence and penalties. The middle space is occupied largely by taxpayers
who wish to be broadly compliant, but who might need more help or persua-
sion to comply.
Timothy AO Endicott, Vagueness in Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000);
Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory ofFreedom and Government (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1997) at 176.
12 Braithwaite, "Legal Certainty", supra note 9;Judith Freedman "Improving (Not Perfect-
ing) Tax Legislation: Rules and Principles Revisited" (2010) 30:6 British Tax Review717
[Freedman, "Improving"].
13 See Australian Government: Australian Taxation Office, Introduction to the Compliance
Model, online: <http://www.ato.gov.au>.
14 See Murphy, supra note 2 (for further examples). See also Part III of this article, which
discusses methods used to encourage business taxpayers to refrain for exploiting all possi-
ble tax avoidance opportunities that they feel might be open to them.
630 VOL. 44:3
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It is likely, however, that some taxpayers within this middle space con-
sider themselves entitled to take advantage of 'grey' areas in the law and be-
lieve themselves to be compliant already, within their own definition of the
law, even though they maybe aware that their view is contentious. Given the
indeterminacy of some tax law, it may even be that the taxpayer's view of the
effect of a particular law is as likely to be upheld by the courts as that of the
revenue authority's view.
In most systems of tax law, and certainly in the UK and in Canada, there
is a line between evasion on the one hand (involving fraud or at least non-
disclosure and thus illegal), and avoidance on the other. Avoidance does not
depend on hiding the activity concerned, but relies upon a particular reading
of the tax legislation and may often involve steps inserted for tax purposes
rather than commercial reasons. At one end of this avoidance spectrum there
will be aggressive, artificial or what the Canadian courts have termed "abu-
sive" avoidance. Sometimes these abusive forms of avoidance are prevented
from working by a general anti-avoidance statutory provision (GAAR, in
Canada") or the application ofjudicially developed principles (as in the US'"
and, possibly, the UK 7 ). At the other end of the spectrum is tax planning or
mitigation, which may be entered into for overall commercial reasons but
may have elements which are designed to save tax. In most jurisdictions there
will be occasions on which this will work to achieve the tax minimization
15 Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) s 245.
16 The USA now has a mixture ofjudicial doctrines developed since the initial decision in
Gregory vHelvering, 293 US 465 (1935), and statutory codification of the economic sub-
stance doctrine introduced by The Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of2010,
Pub L No 111-152,124 Star 1029, inserting§ 7701(o) into InternalRevenue Code, USC
tic 26. See IRS, Codification ofEconomic Substance Doctrine andRelated Penalties (14 Sep-
tember 2010), online: <http://www.irs.gov>.
17 The UK appeared to have developed a judicial doctrine in the case of WTRamsay Ltdv
IRC, [1982] AC 300 (HL), but the position has been unclear since the decision in Bar-
clays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawsoni, [2004] UKIH L 51, [2005] 1 AC 684
[BMBFJ. See also Judith Freedman "Interpreting Tax Statutes: Tax Avoidance and the In-
tention of Parliament" (2007) 123 Law Quarterly Review 52 [Freedman, "Interpreting
Tax"].
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sought technically and in the determination of the courts.'" The revenue au-
thorities and tax payer may have different ideas about where the line should
be drawn within this spectrum and without litigation there may be reasona-
bly held differing views as to which party is correct. The line between tax
planning which the courts will hold to be effective and abusive tax avoidance
which the courts will thwart is sometimes extremely unclear. It is this area
which is referred to in this article as the "grey" area.
The revenue authorities not only have a problem with the group of delib-
erate evaders at the tip of the pyramid, who represent a major leakage or
revenue, but they are also concerned about those taxpayers willing to utilize,
and even insisting on their right to utilize, schemes to minimize taxation
which fall into the grey area. The latter group of taxpayer is seen by the au-
thorities (and others) as posing a threat to the collection of revenue that had
been anticipated by the revenue authority on the basis of the authority's in-
terpretation of the law.'" This group of taxpayers, however, seeing itself as
fully compliant, may be resistant to "persuasion""o since they will consider
that they are being open and transparent and satisfying their legal obliga-
tions."
s See e.g. Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada, 2005 SCC 54,[200512 SCR 601
at paras 44-62 ("Unless the Minister can establish that the avoidance transac-
tion frustrates or defeats the purpose for which the tax benefit was intended to be con-
ferred,it is not abusive"). See also David G Duff & Harry Erlichman, eds, Tax Avoidance
in Canada After Canada Trustco and Mathew (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) (for the Cana-
dian position); supra note 17 (for the UK position).
19 See HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), Measuring Tax Gaps2010 (16 September 2010)
at s 1.1, online: <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk> [HRMC, Measuring] (defining the tax gap
as the "tax that would be paid if all individuals and companies complied with both the let-
ter of the law and HMRC's interpretation of the intention of Parliament in setting law
(referred to as the spirit of the law)").
20 On the meaning of "persuasion" throughout the article, see supra note 13.
21 Although in some jurisdictions, in some situations, they may suffer a penalty if they liti-
gate and lose. See e.g. Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, "The Case Against a Strict Liability
Economic Substance Penalty" (2011) 13 University of PennsylvaniaJournal of Business
Law.
632 VOL. 44:3
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Arising from this situation of the grey area taxpayers, the first problem
discussed here relates to the extent to which persuasion is a legitimate device
for seeking to control behaviour which is not universally accepted to be non-
compliant because there is more than one arguable view. This indeterminacy
is not a problem unique to taX22 but is found frequently in areas of financial
complexity where the law mirrors the complications of the underlying com-
mercial arrangements. A great deal of effort may be expended in finding so-
phisticated ways of keeping to the strict legal position whilst achieving the
objectives of those concerned in these situations. As John Braithwaite has
pointed out, large public corporations in the public eye are good examples of
taxpayers who usually will want to be fully compliant with the law as they
and their advisers interpret it to be, whilst often seeking tenable tax schemes
to minimize their taxes. He shows that this makes the pattern of large busi-
ness compliance egg-shaped rather than pyramidal, with large numbers of
corporate taxpayers falling into the grey area of tax avoidance. John
Braithwaite admits that the approach to such firms has to be different from
that taken with small businesses and individuals because "it is hard to make
compliance strategies work when compliance behaviour is egg-shaped"." He
agrees that law reform is the first "circuit-breaker" needed to push those in
the grey middle bulge down into the base of the egg, but he argues that the
building of cooperative relationships is also necessary and will increase com-
pliance at a reduced cost.24
The difficulty is that, as explained above, the complexity in an area such
as corporate taxation makes it hard to say that some behaviour in the grey
areas is non-compliant, and views differ on the acceptability of such behav-
iour.25 Reasonable onlookers and the authorities might draw the line between
22 Doreen McBarnet, "When Compliance is not the Solution but the Problem: From
Changes in Law to Changes in Attitude" in Braithwaite, Democracy, supra note I at 229.
23 John Braithwaite, "Large Business and the Compliance Model" in Braithwaite, Democ-
racy, supra note 1 177 at 178-181 [Braithwaite, "Large Business"].
24 Ibid at 195.
2 Ibid; Burton,supra note 6; McBarnet & Whelan,supra note 8; Judith Freedman, "Defin-
ing Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a General Anti-Avoidance Principle" (2004)
24:4 British Tax Review 332 [Freedman, "Anti-Avoidance"]; Sol Picciotto "Constructing
633
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unacceptable avoidance and "acceptable" tax planning in different places,
depending on their views of the role of taxation, the fact situation in each
case and even the amount of revenue at stake.2 ' This can make it difficult to
say when persuasion to behave in certain way which is not clearly non-
compliant is appropriate.
To most lawyers, the answer is that the courts must decide where that line
should be drawn by determining the proper meaning of the law.27 On this
view, taxpayers in the grey area move into the bottom of the pyramid if the
behaviour they have undertaken is held by the courts to be in accordance
with a proper interpretation of the law. Only the courts can give that inter-
pretation.8 Until the issue has come to court, however, different views may
be taken on the proper interpretation of legislation. It has been suggested
that it may suit the revenue authority at times for matters not to be heard by
the judges in case the courts decide against the authority's view of what the
law should be."
Compliance: Game-Playing, Tax Law and the Regulatory State" (2007) 29:1 Law and
Pol'y 11.
2 In fact the grey area is not uniform, but has to be seen as having various shades or grada-
tions: see Judith Freedman, Geoffrey Loomer & John Vella, "Analyzing The Enhanced
Relationship Between Corporate Taxpayers and Revenue Authorities: A U.K. Case
Study" in James Dalton & Martha Eller Gangi, eds, Recent Research on Tax Administra-
tion and Compliance: Selected Papers Given at the IRS 2009 Research Conference, online:
Internal Revenue Service <http://www.irs.gov> 103 at 119, 125-26.
27 That is, in accordance with the formal conception of the rule of law described in supra
note 7.
28 Lord Hoffmann, "Tax Avoidance" (2005) 25:2 British Tax Review 197. See also Freed-
man, "Interpreting Tax", supra note 17 (particularly the literature on statutory interpreta-
tion discussed at infra notes 69-72 and further in this article below);HM Revenue &
Customs (HMRC), Summary ofResponses: A Code of Practice for Taxation on Banks
(London: HMRC, 2009), online: <http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk> (for the carefully
worded but still controversial discussion of this issue).
29 McBarnet, supra note 22 at 237 (in the context of both the Financial Reporting Review
Panel and the UK Inland Revenue, as it then was). See also David M Fogel, "The Inside
Scoop About the IRS's Appeals Division", Tax Notes 99:10 (2 June 2003) 1503, cited in
Joshua D Blank, "In Defense of Tax Privacy" 61 EmoryLJ [forthcoming in 2011] at 35, n
202.
VOL. 44:3634
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Some would argue that the courts at times do not go far enough to con-
strue the legislation in accordance with the intent of the legislature or what
these critics would argue is the "spirit of the law". It is the task of the courts to
find the intention of the legislature, primarily by reference to the wording of
the statute. In some jurisdictions there will be more scope for purposive in-
terpretation by the courts than in others. Some jurisdictions, but not others,
may permit courts to look at background papers. Every tax system, however,
imposes some limits on the extent to which courts can interpret legislation in
such a way as to close gaps left by the wording of the statute. If by "spirit of
the law" is meant simply the proper intention of the legislature as discovered
by the application of permissible purposive construction, then of course the
courts should be finding the spirit of the law and the taxpayer should be
abiding by this.so But others suggest that the spirit of the law may be found
outside the decision of the courts, in terms of what is acceptable to the reve-
nue authorities or current government, or perhaps even non-governmental
organizations." This means that there may be a gap between the quite proper
interpretation given by the courts (based on the limitations of the system, on
30 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) OECD Guide-
linesfor MultinationalEnterprises (25 May 2011), online <http://www.oecd.org> at ch
11 ("Complyingwith the spirit of the law means discerning and following the intention
of the legislature. It does not require an enterprise to make payment in excess of the
amount legally required pursuant to such an interpretation" although the commentary
goes further and states that "An enterprise complies with the spirit of the tax laws and
regulations if it takes reasonable steps to determine the intention of the legislature and in-
terprets those tax rules consistent with that intention in light of the statutory language
and relevant, contemporaneous legislative history". It is not necessarily the case that the
law of the jurisdiction permits consideration of the latter factor.)
31 See HMRC, Measuring,supra note 19. See also Acd onAid, Calling Time: Why SABMil-
lershouldstop dodging taxes in Africa (London: ActionAid 2010) at 7 ("Tax avoidance ac-
tivities are designed to comply with the letter of the law, not to break it as in the case of
tax evasion. We use the term to cover strategies that are legally permissible, but which Ac-
tionAid regards as ethically questionable. Throughout this report, we use the terms'tax
dodging' and 'tax avoidance' interchangeably.").
635
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language and on the legislative process) and the view of the current revenue
authorities on the meaning and intent of the law."
It is notable that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment's (OECD) Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries (The Inter-
mediaries Study)3 defines the aggressive tax planning that it seeks to control
as including "[p]lanning involving ataxposition that is tenable but has unin-
tended and unexpected tax revenue consequences. Revenue bodies' concerns
relate to the risk that tax legislation can be misused to achieve results which
were not foreseen by the legislators."3 1
The OECD's study is careful to talk about the intention ofthe legislators
and describes this behaviour as misuse. The intentions of the legislators are
not, however, always crystal clear. Taking a position that is tenable, even if the
tax authorities do not like it, might not necessarily be misuse. Sometimes the
tax authorities and the commentators slip into equating the intention of the
legislators with that of the tax authorities. Thus, John Braithwaite himself
32 See Hoffmann, supra note 28 (the "onlyway in which Parliament can express an intention
to impose a tax is by a statute that means such atax is to be imposed"). On this view, if the
wording of the statute as interpreted by the courts does not successfully impose the tax
then it cannot have been the intention of parliament to do so." The intention of parlia-
ment in this sense must be distinguished from the intention of the government, or their
advisers, or individual members of the government, who might have felt very differently,
or would have felt differently had they thought about it. See Jeremy Waldron, Law and
Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at ch 6, taking issue with Andrei
Marmor's Interpretation andLegal Theory, 2d ed (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005). See
alsoHMRCvMayes, [2011] EWCA Civ 407, [2011] STC 1269. In this case relating to a
complex and highly artificial tax avoidance scheme, the Court of Appeal reluctantly
found for the taxpayers. The legislation did not provide any underlying or overridingpur-
pose that enabled the courts to apply a purposive interpretation to reach the result that
they felt instinctively would have been correct. Lord Justice Thomas and Lord Justice
Toulson both commented that this was a result that parliament could not have foreseen or
intended, but by this they meant that they could not look at "intention of parliament" in
the wider sense but could only look at the wording of the statute.
3 OECD, Study into the Role ofTax Intermediaries (2008), online: <http://www.oecd.org>
[OECD, Intermediaries].
* Ibid at 10 [emphasis added].
636 VOL. 44:3
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refers to the "many who do not intend to comply with what the [Australian
Tax Office] regards as the policy purposes of the parliament's laws".
If it is accepted, however, that ultimately the question of the proper inter-
pretation of the intention of the legislature must be a question for the courts,
then the issue must be whether the legislature is adequately conveying its
intention to the courts and whether the courts are interpreting legislation
competently. Moreover, unless a purely legal analysis is utilized to draw the
line between what is tax avoidance and what is not, the question arises: where
else could the required standard of behaviour possibly come from? Who
should adjudicate between the interpretation of the tax authorities and that
of the taxpayer on the true meaning of legislation if it is not the courts?
The question of who decides the meaning of avoidance is discussed fur-
ther below. The first problem discussed in this article, however, addresses the
discretionary scope tax officers have where treatment of a taxpayer, before
and until a contentious issue reaches the courts, is concerned. Given that it is
generally considered necessary in order to satisfy the requirements of the rule
oflaw" for taxes to be imposed clearly by their legislatures and not by admin-
istrators, to what extent under responsive regulation regimes can revenue
authorities pay more attention to taxpayers who are working within the lim-
its of the law as they believe it to be but who are applying an interpretation
that the revenue authorities find questionable, or perhaps even one they re-
luctantly agree with but the result of which they dislike?
The use of persuasion to encourage compliance beyond that which might
be required by law could result in unequal or disproportionate burdens on
taxpayers who are not actually disobeying the law. Further, giving tax officials
too much power to decide when to pursue a matter and when to apply a light
touch, or even to settle with a taxpayer, could lead to an incentive for corpo-
rate managers to attempt to exercise influence over tax officers. There might
even be a temptation towards corruption or at least regulatory capture result-
ing from "large unchecked power", as has been argued by Grbich in an Aus-
3 Braithwaite, "Large Business", supra note 23 at 179.
36 See supra note 7.
637
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tralian context.17 If some taxpayers are dealt with by using a "light touch"
because they are trusted, others might complain that the same advantages are
not available to them, perhaps because a scheme that is available to one sector
of the population is not available to all." Collectively these issues will be re-
ferred to in this article as the "rule of law" problem.
The second problem highlighted in this article is the relationship be-
tween responsive regulation and risk management. For tax authorities that
are short of resources, an attraction of the compliance pyramid is that it of-
fers less intensive approaches to administration for those voluntarily compli-
ant taxpayers located at the base, allowing more concentration of resources
higher up the pyramid where they can make a real difference. It is clearly rea-
sonable to have some system of resource allocation, since no system has
unlimited resources. Assigning to taxpayers a level of risk related to their be-
haviour and their own governance mechanisms, assists in placing them on the
compliance pyramid," but a mechanistic risk rating process will be far from
responsive and tax authorities should not equate the two approaches. Past
behaviour may not be a guide to future actions; resource allocation based on
such a backward-looking risk rating could mean that problems are not an-
* Yuri Grbich, "After Bellinz and Ralph: ANew Focus for Decision-Making in the Austra-
lian Tax System" in Michael Walpole & Christopher Evans, eds, Tax Administration in the
21st Century (Sydney: Prospect Media, 2001), cited in Braithwaite, Markets, supra note 1
(this is not a suggestion that any corruption has actually taken place, either in the UK or
elsewhere. Grbich was making the point that tax officials might develop a desire to please
those whom they are supposed to be regulating under responsive regulation). See also
Burton, supra note 6 at 102. Most jurisdictions will have administrative mechanisms to
review this exercise of power internally within the revenue organization itself and by giv-
ing powers to external review bodies-for example the National Audit Office in the UK
and the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration in the US; nevertheless a
situation is set up where a large degree of discretion is given to individuals.
38 See e.g. Part III, below, especially infra note 88 (for the discussion of the enhanced rela-
tionship between the UK revenue authority and large businesses).
* John Braithwaite, "Meta Risk Management and Responsive Regulation for Tax System
Integrity" (2003) 25:1 Law and Pol'y 1.
VOL. 44:3638
HeinOnline  -- 44 U.B.C. L. Rev. 638 2011
2011 RESPONSIVE REGULATION, RISK, AND RULES
ticipated and that improved behaviour is not rewarded quickly enough to
have an impact.40
This second problem is compounded when combined with the existence
of the grey area discussed above. A high risk rating based on behaviour that
the taxpayer considers acceptable, though the tax authority does not, could
lead to a negative reaction from the taxpayer. It might actually reduce co-
operation in other areas of this taxpayer's tax administration, since this
would not be seen to lead to any benefits, even though the taxpayer might be
ready to be transparent and open about what it is doing. It could push the
taxpayer further from the behaviour required rather than closer. For these
reasons it is not clear that risk rating for the purposes of resource allocation is
necessarily always consistent with the use of responsive regulation, although
superficially it appears to fit well. This will be referred to in this article as the
cmixed objectives" problem. The "rule of law" and "mixed objectives" prob-
lems described above are discussed further in Part III.
III. RESPONSIVE REGULATION AND ENHANCED
COOPERATION WITH LARGE BUSINESS
A. SPREAD OF THE MODEL AND APPLICATION TO LARGE BUSINESS
TAXPAYERS
Tax officials around the world who have never read an academic article, or
even heard ofJohn Braithwaite, are familiar with the regulatory pyramid and
compliance model developed by his team. A pyramidal model of responsive
regulation was introduced into the Australian Tax Office (ATO) in 1998,
based on the work ofBraithwaite's Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI).4 '
Through this medium and by adoption in a number of jurisdictions, these
ideas are being introduced more widely.
40 See Julia Black, "The Emergence of Risk-Based Regulation and the New Public Risk
Management in the United Kingdom" [2005] PL 512 [Black, "Emergence"]; Robert
Baldwin & Julia Black, "Really Responsive Regulation" (2008) 71:1 Mod L Rev 59.
41 Murphy, supra note 2.
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The OECD has helped to spread this concept. Taking large business tax-
payers as a case study we can note the impact of the Intermediaries Study.12
This focused on large corporate taxpayers as those supplying much of the
demand for aggressive tax avoidance schemes, 43 which are provided by profes-
sional and other intermediaries. The Intermediaries Study develops a concep-
tual framework for an enhanced relationship between large corporate tax-
payers and tax administrations as a way of tackling what it perceives to be
increasing aggressive tax avoidance. This requires a collaborative, trust-based
relationship between revenue bodies and large corporate taxpayers and may
require both sides to go beyond statutory obligations. The framework was
informed by the experiences of jurisdictions which have already established
such co-operative relationships such as Ireland, the Netherlands, and the
US."
To explain the concept with an example, perhaps the most developed and
most co-operative model of this relationship is to be found in the Nether-
lands. It has been noted that it builds on a long tradition in the Netherlands
of a consensus or "polder" model 5 and so does not derive purely from more
modern writing on responsive regulation, but the similarities are obvious. 6
The approach, known as "horizontal monitoring", was adopted by the Dutch
tax authorities in combination with risk rating when it appeared that a
42 OECD,Intermediaries,supra note 33. See also OECD, OECD Tax Intermediaries Study:
WorkingPaper5: Risk Management (OECD, 2007), online: <http://www.oecd.org>. See
also EC, Fiscalis Risk Management Platform Group, Compliance Risk Management Guide
for Tax Administrations (2010), online: <http://ec.europa.cu>.
43 See OECD, Intermediaries, supra note 33 at 10-11 (for the OECD definition of aggres-
sive tax planning).
4 Ibid at Annex 8.1.
45 Named after the polders of land, which is land regained from the sea through the con-
struction of embankments or dikes, requiring co-operation from all living on them to
maintain them.
4 Richard Happ6, "Multinationals, Enforcement Covenants, and Fair Share" [2007] Inter-
tax 537, reprinted in Judith Freedman, ed, Beyond Boundaries: DevelopingApproaches to
TaxAvoidanceand Tax Risk Management (Oxford: Oxford University Centre for Busi-
ness Taxation, 2008) at 157.
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"command and control" and a "one size fits all" approach was failing, in par-
ticular with large multinationals.4 7 The system, based on voluntary individu-
alized enforcement covenants, requires voluntary reporting in return for re-
duced auditing. The requirement to disclose goes beyond reporting actions
involving "tax risks" and requires disclosure of the taxpayer's views about the
legal consequences of its actions and the positions taken by it. This has been
criticized by Richard Happ6 as being too vague a requirement and he also
points out that the entire system is based even more on trust than similar
systems in other countries (such as Australia), where more due diligence veri-
fication takes place before an agreement is entered into by the authorities
with a taxpayer than in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the Dutch horizontal
monitoring system does require that the tax authority is satisfied with the
company's tax control framework and that the audit committee of the com-
pany is obliged to review the company's tax strategy for tax planning." In
return, the company not only has its administrative burdens reduced as a
result of less auditing, but it is also able to obtain certainty upfront on some
tax issues.49 This underlines the importance of the two-way trust: the rela-
tionship works only if the taxpayer and tax authority both gain something.
But this could raise questions if it were to involve the tax authority making
concessions, or resulted in withdrawal of the covenant because the company
wanted to test the meaning of legislation by litigating it.
Happ6 reports that the Dutch Ministry of Finance has suggested that
taxpayers who have concluded a covenant and then are "caught doing some-
thing you should not, you will be dealt with more severely than in other
situations"."o He comments that in such a situation the authority would be
"expected to respond proportionately, within the boundaries of the law", but
he adds that what these words mean is unclear. The relationship created by
enforcement covenants thus raises rule of law questions about clarity and
47 Ibid.
48 Eelco van der Enden, Jos de Groot & Eric van der Stroom, "Netherlands" in Anuschka
Bakker & Sander Kloosterhof, eds, Tax Risk Management: From Risk to Opportunity
(Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 2010).
4 Ibid at 332.
5o Happ6, supra note 46 at 168.
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equality of treatment of different taxpayers and the extent to which the
covenant can reasonably be permitted to allow variations in such treatment
by way or responsive regulation.
B. "ENHANCED CO-OPERATION" BETWEEN LARGE BUSINESS AND
THE REVENUE AUTHORITY IN THE UK
We shall now turn to the UK for a further example of this type of relation-
ship between the tax authority and large corporations, known in the UK as
"enhanced co-operation" It arose from a review oflinks with large businesses,
known as the Varney Review," which aimed at creating a relationship based
on trust and understanding between large corporate taxpayers and HMRC.
HMRC put forward proposals designed to achieve four desired outcomes:
greater certainty, an efficient risk based approach to dealing with tax matters,
speedy resolution of issues, and clarity through effective consultation and
dialogue. The proposals, which all sought to contribute towards the en-
hanced relationship, included the introduction of a system of advance rulings
for businesses in certain circumstances, a new approach to transfer pricing
enquiries, a process for the quick and efficient resolution of issues, a new con-
sultation framework, improved guidance, and the introduction of a risk rat-
ing system, intended to give a "more cost effective use of resources and effi-
cient resolution of issues".12
51 See HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), 2006ReviewofLinks with Large Business (Lon-
don: HMRC, 2006) [HMRC, Review ofLinks]; HMRC, Makinga Difference: Delivering
the Review ofLinks with Large Business (HMRC, March 2007); HMRC, Approach to
Compliance Risk ManagementforLarge Business (London: HMRC, 2007) [HMRC,Ap-
proach]; HMRC, Theframework for a better relationshp: Making a Difference: Review of
Links withLargeBusiness (London: HMRC, 2008). See also Judith Freedman, Geoffrey
Loomer & John Vella, "Corporate Tax Risk and Tax Avoidance: New Approaches"
(2009) 29:1 British Tax Review74 [Freedman, Loomer & Vella, "New Approaches"] (for
a detailed discussion ofthe UK tax approach; note that the 2007 guidance on tax compli-
ance risk management discussed in that paper was revised in 2009, and has now been re-
vised further as described in this article. This revision meets some of the criticisms made
in that article).
52 HMRC, Review ofLinks, supra note 51 at 6, 16.
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C. THE RISK RATING PROCESS
The risk rating process is premised on the basis of voluntary compliance
from low-risk rated companies, allowing resources to be focused on those
who present higher risks. There is considerable reliance on the taxpayer's
own systems and governance in deciding the risk assessment. 3 The process
used to decide on risk status is described in HMRC's on-line Tax Compli-
ance Risk Management Manual (TCRM).14 The TCRM is written for
HMRC's own staff but doubles as a document giving guidance to taxpayers.
Each large company dealt with by the Large Business Service (LBS) of
HMRC and some smaller companies also are awarded a risk rating." This
may be low risk or non-low risk and the risk level determines the volume of
HMRC's interventions in the company's affairs and the nature of the work-
ing relationship between the two. In essence, a light touch is adopted for low-
risk companies, thus releasing resources that can be directed towards higher
risk companies. For taxpayers who are rated as low risk there is not normally
another Business Risk Review for three years. For others the risk rating is
revisited annually and there are also other more frequent interventions." The
idea is that taxpayers will be keen to have fewer interventions by being classi-
fied as low risk and HMRC may make savings by examining primarily the
systems of those companies rather than every detail and by making fewer
interventions because they trust the figures coming from the taxpayer. The
HMRC risk rating is confidential and not required to be disclosed in pub-
lished accounts.
5 HMRC, Approach,supra note 51 at para 3.11; Braithwaite, "Large Business", supra note
23.
5 HMRC, Index Tax Compliance Risk Management Process (TCRM)-Main Contents,
online: <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk> [HMRC, TCRM].
5 See HMRC, LargeBusiness Service, online: <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk>; HMRC,Large
Businesses serviced by Local Compliance-delivering a new relationship, online:
<http://www.hmrc.gov.uk> (this approach was initially adopted by the Large Business
Service for the 770 largest companies in the UK but was then rolled out to some smaller
businesses falling within HMRC's Local Compliance (Large & Complex) teams (LCLC)
and now the principles are filtering through to smaller businesses).
s6 HMRC, TCRM, supra note 54 at TCRM 1000.
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Risk is based on a number of factors, includinglevel of complexity of the
business and its relationships with others, pace of change, governance, open-
ness and co-operation, ability to deliver the "right" tax through systems proc-
esses and skills, tax strategy and finally "contribution", that is whether the
amount of tax declared looks "reasonable." 7 It can be seen from this brief
description that many judgments are involved in this assessment. Who de-
cides what is the "right" or reasonable amount of tax, how are tax systems to
be judged and what kind of tax strategy is acceptable? HMRC's view of this
is given in the TCRM, which was revised in April2011 to make some clarifi-
cations, as discussed below.
On the whole and even given the uncertainties, anecdotal and survey evi-
dence suggests that business has found the approach helpful." Problems that
have emerged have to some extent been recognized in the revision of the
TCRM issued in April2011. The minutes of the Business Tax Forum (BTF),
a group of tax directors from major companies that meets with high ranking
HMRC officials on a regular basis, reveal several of these issues. 9 Not sur-
prisingly, these are similar to survey comments based on interviews with a
group of company representatives undertaken by the author and colleagues.60
D. CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP MANAGERS
One area that has concerned business is the degree to which having a cus-
tomer relationship manager (CRM) can assist to increase transparency and
save time. For large businesses which have them, CRMs who get to know the
1 Ibidat TCRM3310.
5 Freedman, Loomer & Vella, "New Approaches", supra note 51; Sally Malam et al, Large
Business Customer Survey: FullReport, August2010: Her Majestys Revenue and Customs
Research Report 102 (London: HMRC, 2010), online: <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk>; IFF
Research, Large Business Panel Survey: Businesses'Experience of HMR C: Her Majesty's
Revenue and Customs Research Report 142 (London: HMRC, 2011), online:
<http://www.hmrc.gov.uk> (the 2011 report largely confirms the findings of the 2010
report).
5 See HM Revenue & Customs, Business Tax Forum, online <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk>
(HMRC, BTF] (for minutes of these meetings and membership of the BTF).
6o Freedman, Loomer & Vella, "New Approaches", supra note 51.
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business and work closely with it, have proved to be beneficial in many cases,
always subject to the quality of the individual CRM. 6' In particular, a CRM
assists with transparency of decision making, though once technical special-
ists get involved this seems to decrease again.6 2 This suggests that investment
in understanding the business of customers and spending time talking with
them pays off, as would be expected from the work on responsive regulation.
Re-enforcing the value businesses find in dealing with CRMs, the BTF
minutes note that transparency of decision making remains a problem and
question why and when specialists are sometimes involved rather than leav-
ing matters to the CRM.63 In some areas, notably transfer pricing, specialists
are called in to deal with issues arising and some businesses feel that the ad-
vantages of having a CRM are diluted.
This shows the difficult balance between the encouragement of trust and
voluntary compliance through good relationships with revenue officials and
the maintenance and application of consistent standards across all taxpayers.
If all matters were to be left to CRMs, it can be imagined that policy coher-
ence and horizontal equity between taxpayers could be lost. On the other
hand the relationship of trust will work only if the officials have sufficient
authority. This is a general problem with the management of the exercise of
discretion. Moreover the CRM relationship with business has the potential
to open up questions about over-familiarity and this problem needs to be
guarded against by moving CRMs around fairly frequently, but not so fre-
quently that they cannot get to know the business they are working with.
E. CRITERIA FOR RISK RATING: TAX PLANNING
One example of the concerns with the enhanced relationship was that there
was initially a view that very large and complex businesses could never receive
a low risk rating. This seemed to remove an incentive to amend behaviour to
achieve a low risk rating, since it was thought that was impossible anyway in
61 Malam et al, supra note 58. Freedman, Loomer & Vella, "New Approaches", supra note 51.
62 Ibid.
63 HMRC, BTF, supra note 59 at 20 July 2010; IFF Research,supra note 58 at 3.26.
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the case ofmany of the companies targeted." There would be a problem with
placing taxpayers on a linear risk rating system when in fact the material fac-
tors are far more varied than this suggests. The guidelines now attempt to
make plain that
while factors such as the size and complexity of a business create their own
risks and can make it more challenging for customers to comply with their
tax obligations, even the largest and most complex businesses can be classi-
fied as Low Risk if they mitigate these risks to an acceptable level through
their behaviours.65
It is stressed in the revised TCRM that this is not purely theoretical.
There are already a number of highly complex large businesses which have
been identified as low risk." Attaining this classification, however, requires
not only transparency and adequate governance systems but also considera-
tion of the approach of the taxpayer to tax planning. Whilst the TCRM is
clearly intended to clarify the position, this leaves a considerable amount of
discretion with the CRM and HMRC generally.
The BTF minutes for July 20, 2010 noted that there was a feeling that
HMRC had made it more difficult to become low risk and that there was
some ambiguity over what was considered to be "tax planning". This is the
problem that lies at the heart of how to decide whether a corporate taxpayer
is "compliant" or within the grey area described above and, as discussed there,
taxpayers and HMRC may take different views of the position. The new
TCRM is intended to clarify this also. One of the seven factors that will be
assessed in assessing risk is tax strategy, which is described as "the customer's
involvement in tax planning which does not support genuine commercial
activity"67
This is further explained at TCRM3330." To be sure to be low risk a cus-
tomer must not structure transactions ina way which "gives a tax result con-
6 Freedman, Loomer & Vella, "New Approaches", supra note5 1.
65 HMRC, TCRM, supra note 54 at TCRM3100.
66 IbidatTCRM3310.
67 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
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trary to the intentions of Parliament" and must tell HMRC about "transac-
tions involving innovative interpretation of tax law and fully disclose any
legal uncertainty". Occasional engagement in tax planning that contravenes
these guidelines might be tolerated provided there is full disclosure but fail-
ure to inform HMRC about this activity as well as more regular engagement
in such activity both increase the chance of being found not to be low risk.
The difficulty with these guidelines is that they rely on criteria which are
not to be found in the UK statutes or case law. There is currently no statu-
tory GAAR in the UK,"9 nor ajudicial anti-avoidance doctrine which explic-
itly bases validity upon "genuine commercial activity".70 It is arguable that
this might be a desirable requirement, but it is not one under current law.
The current position in the UK is that there is no judicial doctrine that ap-
plies to tax avoidance but that the courts must apply purposive interpretation
as in other areas.7' The courts must ask "whether the relevant statutory provi-
sions, construed purposively, were intended to apply to the transaction,
viewed realistically."72
BMBF and subsequent cases have reiterated that this does not amount to
an overriding power to strike down transactions that have no commercial
purpose. 73 It is not entirely certain how far the courts believe that viewing the
facts realistically can take them but the House of Lords was clear that it
would be going too far to say that transactions or elements of transactions
69 See HM Treasury, News Release, 04/11, "Details ofAvoidance Study Group set out" (14
January 2011) (the question ofwhether the UK should adopt a GAAR is currently under
discussion and the author is a member of a study group set up under the leadership of
Graham Aaronson QC to advice ministers on this issue; the study group is due to report
in October 2011).
70 See Financial Markets Law Committee (FMLC), Issue 146-Proposed HMRC Code:
Response to theJune 2009 HM Revenue & Customs Consultation Document on a Code of
Practicefor Banks (London: FMLC, 2009), online: <http://www.fmlc.org> (comments
on a proposed code of practice on taxation for banks).
71 BMBF, supra note 17 especially para 33.
72 Collector ofStamp Revenue v ArrowtownAssets Ltd [2003] HK CFA 46, para 35, cited in
ibid.
7 Ibid at para 36; HMRC v Mayes, supra note 32 at para 74.
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which had no commercial purpose should always be disregarded. It is all a
question of the interpretation of the relevant statute.
The test of commerciality expressed in the TCRM can be, therefore,
only a rule of thumb that is applied by HMRC. Many tax directors of large
companies would agree that this was a fairly useful guide to the type of activ-
ity that will ultimately be upheld by the courts74 but it is not the actual test
that is to be applied as a matter of law. Furthermore, the advisers and direc-
tors of the taxpayer might have a different interpretation from HMRC of the
meaning of the statutory provision, including what is included as "commer-
cial", even taking into account the need to construe statutes purposively and
in line with the "intention of the legislature"." Nevertheless, it follows from
the description of the factors relevant to risk rating in the TCRM that tax-
payers disagreeingwith HMRC interpretations too often will find it difficult
to obtain or maintain a low risk rating. Potentially, this places good deal of
power in the hands of HMRC in asserting their interpretation of the
legislation. The taxpayer can of course still appeal to the courts and argue
against HMRC's view of the tax liability based on the interpretation of
particular legislation, but it might lose its low risk rating, which HMRC
seeks to argue is a valuable status to have as it results in lower administrative
costs and burdens.76 If low risk status is desirable, and many large companies
seem to agree it is, although others query the benefits,7 then this is a
7 See Freedman, Loomer & Vella, "New Approaches", supra note 51 at 111 (where tax di-
rectors interviewed referred to commerciality as a guide).
7 See supra note 32.
76 HMRC, Review ofLinks, supra note 51 at ss 1.11-1.15. See also HMRC, BTF, supra note
59 at 1 November 2010, s 5; (HMRC claims as a further benefit of being low risk that
they would trust the business to raise any tax issues so that the low-risk business can set
the agenda).
n As explained above, the consequences relate to the frequencyof interventions by HMRC
and thus the cost and burden of administration. In an HMRC survey two thirds ofcom-
panies responding indicated that they took their risk status into account when structuring
their tax affairs (IFF Research, supra note 58). On the other hand, in interviews some di-
rectors have suggested that the benefits of a low risk rating are not always clear: Freedman,
Loomer & Vella, "New Approaches", supra note 51; HMRC, BTF, supra note 59 at I No-
vember 2010. See also IFF Research, supra note 58 at 1.24 ("In the follow-up interviews
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potential rule of law concern, as the taxpayer has no mechanism for
appealing the risk rating, since this is purely an administrative tool.
It is significant that the BTF minutes for November 2010 stated that
HMRC confirmed that a taxpayer cannot be low risk if it participates in
avoidance schemes. Business representatives responded that there were still
areas of confusion regarding tax planning and some thought that the benefit
of being transparent was diluted by this complication. It would appear that
they felt that they should be able to interpret the law in a way that seemed
reasonable to them provided they disclosed this, rather than being given a
higher risk rating purely because they took a different view from that of
HMRC.7 1 So it seems that whilst some businesses do value low risk ratings
and other advances resulting from enhanced co-operation, such as real time
working, and may even be prepared to modify their behaviour to gain these
perceived benefits, others are not certain that the benefits of a low risk rating
outweigh the resulting loss of freedom to engage in tax arrangements that
HMRC dislikes, but which the business considers to be reasonable tax plan-
ning. The question then is whether if the objective is primarily to increase
resource allocation, risks could not be achieved simply through transparency
rather than also expecting businesses to refrain from certain types of tax
planning.
Whilst the revised TC RM issued in April2011 did not deal conclusively
with all the issues raised in the BTF meetings and in surveys, it did clearly
seek to respond to some of the concerns. The experiment of enhanced co-
operation with business is generally considered to be a successful one.7 ' The
modifications and improvements may be considered to be a good example of
the helpful outcome of a valuable regulatory conversation." Even this inter-
action can raise some concerns, however, since there is sometimes a percep-
tion that the largest businesses with access to CRMs and the ability to enjoy a
some businesses did, however, indicate that they felt that the benefits of being low risk
could be clearer and that it was important that low risk meant less scrutiny and that it
provided cost and time savings").
7 HMRC, BTF, supra note 59 at 1 November 2010.
79 IFF Research, supra note 58.
s Malam et al, supra note 58. Freedman, Loomer & Vella, "New Approaches", supra note 51.
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close relationship with HMRC may obtain benefits not available to other,
smaller taxpayers. If the advantages of an enhanced relationship are as
claimed then it follows that those to whom such a relationship is not avail-
able are not being treated as advantageously as the larger firms. This is sup-
ported by HMRC's own survey material which shows that businesses with-
out a CRM were less satisfied with the service provided by HMRC than
were those with a CRM.8 1
IV. APPLYING THE THEORY TO PRACTICE
A. THE RULE OF LAW AND THE MIXED OBJECTIVE PROBLEMS
In the examples of a new approach to tax compliance outlined in Part III,
there are suggestions of both the rule of law problem and the mixed objec-
tives problems referred to at the end of Part II.
In his Fasken lecture, John Braithwaite states that lawyers need to be
weaned off the obsession with regulation being only about rule compliance.12
Insistence on a literal interpretation of detailed rules is clearly unhelpful in
the tax area as in any other. Many, including this author, have argued that tax
legislation should be based on principles so that creative compliance and
game-playing are discouraged.83 As discussed above, however, there are areas
of genuine uncertainty in the tax arena and appeals to morality will not re-
solve these uncertainties. Not only is there not always an obvious morally
right answer to the question of how much tax should be paid, but taxpayers
will argue, reasonably, that their liability to pay tax is about the duty imposed
on them by law, so that only the law can answer that question." Taxes are not
voluntary contributions and therefore there must be a question mark over
8 IFF Research, supra note 58 at 1.3-1.9.
82 Braithwaite, "Essence", supra note 1.
8 Braithwaite, "Dancing", supra note 10; Freedman, "Anti-Avoidance", supra note 26;
Freedman, "Improving", supra note 12.
4 See ibid.
VOL. 44:3650
HeinOnline  -- 44 U.B.C. L. Rev. 650 2011
2011 RESPONSIVE REGULATION, RISK, AND RULES
the extent to which sums not clearly required to be paid by law should be
coaxed out of taxpayers by persuasion."
Braithwaite himself acknowledges that "routine regulatory encounters
taking the high moral ground tend to be counterproductive."" If that is the
case then proper consideration has to be given to the actual legal position
rather than some vague and unenforceable notion of the "spirit of the law", if
that is read as going beyond the law as it would be applied by the courts.17 If
the only purpose of relying on the spirit of the law is to impose payment of
more than the law would require, or even to avoid the trouble and expense of
having to investigate what the law would require in fact, this does seem to be
a potential rule of law problem.
So we can see the possibility, as discussed in Part III above, that if large
corporate taxpayers consider that HMRC's view on the acceptability of tax
planning is too far away from their own and that which the courts will take
in due course, they may consider that a low risk rating is too high a price to
pay for having limits imposed on them beyond the legal limits. Further, if
taxpayers were to continue to be unclear about the benefits of transparency
because interpretations they felt were reasonable were being challenged, then,
although the risk rating might continue to have resource allocation benefits
by virtue of focusing HMRC on activities it considered to be high risk, it
would not work well as a method of encouraging compliant behaviour. This
is an example of the "mixed objectives" problem. Taxpayers might feel that
since they were high risk anyway they might as well be even more aggressive
in their tax planning strategy.
8 Indeed company directors must also consider their fiduciary duty to the members of the
company as a whole, which will often be to enhance shareholder value through maximiz-
ing profits, although not at all costs. For example in UK company law arguably it has al-
ways been acceptable to take into account potential reputational damage and this is now
stated explicitly in s 172 (1) of the CompaniesAct 2006. For a history and critique ofthe
section and the surrounding discussion, see Andrew R Keay "Working Paper: Centre for
Business Law and Practice: The Duty to Promote the Success of the Company: Is it Fit
for Purpose?" [unpublished, archived online: Social Science Research Network
<http://papers.ssrn.com>].
8 Braithwaite, "Essence", supra note 1.
8 See supra notes 30, 31, and accompanying text.
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It can be seen, therefore, that it is important both in terms of going no
further than the law permits and in more pragmatic terms of obtaining trust
and co-operation, for HMRC to keep closely to the law as it would be inter-
preted by the courts if risk rating is to achieve its objectives. Whilst the law is
too uncertain to make this a precise exercise, the criteria used should be those
taken from legislation and case law. Awareness of this need is shown by the
BTF discussions, although the fact that business has raised this as an issue
shows that it is an area that has to be closely watched and a careful balance
found. Similarly, the outcome of discussions on the Code of Practice on
Taxation for Banks in the UK in 2009" showed that critics believe that refer-
ences to requiring banks to comply with the "spirit of the law" and to the
requirement that banks should not engage in tax planning other than that
which "supports genuine commercial activity" go too far to the extent that
they require behaviour going beyond that which is required by law. The Fi-
nancial Markets Law Committee criticized the proposed Code for seeking
"to introduce, through non-statutory means and for one section of the tax
paying community only, an obligation to comply with what is presumably
regarded as a more exacting standard of behaviour than is currently provided
for in legislation."" HMRC responded:
We agree that HMRC should not become responsible for legal interpreta-
tion. Banks will continue to be taxed in accordance with the law. The Code
is not law, but a statement of principles which provide a benchmark for cor-
porate behaviour in relation to governance, tax planning and the relationship
with HMRC.90
Nevertheless, the Code continues to use language that could be seen as
requiring the banks to go beyond their legal obligations. Moreover, HMRC's
reiteration of the genuine commercial activity test in the April2011 TCRM
revision shows that they still think use of this benchmark is acceptable, de-
spite the fact that it continues to be rejected by the courts."' Many banks have
88 FMLC, supra note 70.
89 Ibid at 6.1.
90 Ibidat response on question 1.
9' Supra note 68.
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signed up to the Code 2 and corporate taxpayers have not seen fit to object
too openly to these tests being set out in non-statutory contexts. It remains to
be seen whether any of this has the effect of modifying taxpayer behaviour in
the long run or whether it merely affects presentation.
More generally, the combination of the Code and pressure from non-
governmental organizations, protest groups and the media, which has been
growing in recent months in the UK and elsewhere,93 may have some effect
due to the concerns of business about reputation, although how significant
this will prove to be for the companies involved in the long run remains to be
seen. To the extent that decisions which could impose costs on corporate
taxpayers are taken on the basis of interpretations that go beyond the law, the
points made by the Financial Markets Law Committee seem to remain a
matter for concern. It has been reported, for example, that banks are begin-
ning to require additional checks before lending to partnerships because of
concerns about tax planning." This may have some good effects if it means
they are less likely to fund aggressive pre-packaged tax avoidance schemes
which have little chance of being upheld by the courts in the long run, but is
92 Not wholly surprisingly given the economic situation and the weak position ofthe banks,
including the fact that the UK government has a stake in some of them. See HMT
Budget 2011, para 1.91: "Two hundred banks have now adopted the Code, includingthe
top 15 banks operating in the UK". This appears to have been the result of a certain de-
gree of governmental pressure, see "UK banks given tax deal deadline", BBCNews: Busi-
ness (17 October 2010), online: <http://www.bbc.co.uk>.
9 See UK Uncut, UK Unkut, online: <http://www.ukuncut.org.uk>. The organization has
arranged several protests against the perceived avoidance of tax by large corporations or
their owners. More established charities such as Christian Aid and Action Aid have also
run campaigns against tax avoidance, mostly focusingon problems of international taxa-
tion depriving developing countries of tax revenue: see Act!onAid, supra note 31. On re-
putational effect and tax and corporate social responsibility more generally see Freedman,
Loomer & Vella, "New Approaches", supra note 52; Prem Sikka, "Smoke and Mirrors:
Corporate social responsibility and tax avoidance" (2010) 34 Accounting Forum 153;
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Summer Conference: July 11: Taxing
Corporations: Competitiveness, Transparency andResponsibility, online: <http://www.sbs
.ox.ac.uk> (presentations and videos available for download).
9 Jamie Kaffash, "Firms suffer from banks' fear of avoidance" Accountancy Age (4 May
2011).
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less helpful if it is adding additional costs to loans to commercial structures.
There is clearly a balance to be achieved: if pressed too far the policy behind
the Code of pushing the question of tax strategy into the Board room and
beyond strict legal rules could be counter-productive," but if a firm view of
legal responsibilities is kept in sight it may be a useful tool to prevent compa-
nies concerned about their reputation from takingpositions that are unlikely
to succeed if litigated. Of course some corporate taxpayers will continue to
be bullish about their right to minimize their taxes regardless of these reputa-
tional issues. For those the remedy will be escalation up the pyramid to en-
forcement through the courts if necessary, but it would be wrong if those
companies not concerned about reputation were required to behave only in
accordance with the law, whilst more compliant companies were required to
go beyond the law. Far better to change the law if it cannot prevent unaccept-
able behaviour as it stands."
Some would argue that this analysis places too great an emphasis on the
construction of the legislation by the courts. They might say that there needs
to be confidence in the fairness of the tax system and perhaps more account
should be taken of the views of the public, of non-governmental organiza-
tions and others with an interest in tax administration when determining the
amount of tax that each taxpayer should pay as well as of the administrators
who must operate the system. Picciotto has argued that "the issue of inde-
terminacy and formalism is fundamentally about democracy, since it con-
cerns the processes for generating the authoritative meaning of laws." 7 He
goes on to comment that
A wider and indeed more democratic, legitimacy [than can be obtained from
relying simply on the authority of lawyers as technical specialists] comes
from adopting a more open epistemology, which acknowledges that legal
rules have a wider social resonance and impact, and that their understanding
9s For example, directors might complain of tax uncertainty or even threaten to move busi-
ness outside the UK.
96 Freedman, "Anti-Avoidance", supra note 25 (arguing for a statutory general anti-avoidance
provision for this purpose).
9 Picciotto, supra note 26.
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must be informed by wider social practices, especially those ofthe persons to
whom they are addressed.
If this is intended to suggest that there should be wide consultation in
formulating tax policy and drafting tax legislation, going beyond the legal
experts, then this would command wide acceptance, but it does not support
the interpretation of tax legislation in a way that would not be upheld by the
institutions intended to give effect to enacted legislation following a process
established by the elected representatives of a democratic society. In other
words the legal provisions should reflect social norms and give full effect to
them as far as possible, but this should be fed into the process prior to and
not post enactment. This might require better ways of discussing tax legisla-
tion before it is enacted as well as better methods of drafting. But it is not a
reason to elevate some concept of "the spirit of the law" above the law as it
will be understood by the courts at the interpretation stage. To do that would
be fundamentally undemocratic and open to abuse by pressure groups and
lobbyists as well as undermining the legal system and ultimately potentially
putting the revenue authorities in a very difficult position in which they were
being pressured one way or the other."
9 See e.g. the current debate in the UK over the settlement by HMRC with Vodafone plc.
UK Uncut argued that Vodafone was "let off" a £6 billion tax bill. This figure has been
described by HMRC as "absurd". The case was settled for L1.25 billion, which HMRC
considered was reasonable and which it was within their authority to agree as a matter of
management of the revenue collection system. Nevertheless both HMRC and Vodafone
were widely and vehemently criticized by the media and by UK Uncut, sometimes with
very little understanding ofthe true position.. This shows the dangers ofmoving to public
opinion as a test of the amount of tax to be paid rather than the law. See UK Uncut, Ma-
jor victory: NAO to investigate HMRC's dodgy deal (25 January 2011), online: <http://
www.ukuncut.org.uk>; Duncan Robinson, "Protesters target Vodafone over taxes", Finan-
cial Times (27 October 2010); UK Parliament, Treasury Committee, Uncorrected Tran-
script ofOralEvidence: to be published as HC 731-ii (16 March 2011), online: <http://
www.publications.parliament.uk>. The National Audit Office has now examined the
power ofHMRC to reach such settlements, although not the specific case, and has made
recommendations for improving HMRC's governance in this area: National Audit Of-
fice, HMRevenue & Customs 2010-2011Accounts, Report by the ComptrollerandAuditor
General (July 2011). This is not a purely UK phenomenon: in the US the New York
Times has recently attacked GE, see David Kocieniewski, "At G.E. on Tax Day, Billions of
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So, insisting on compliance with some concept of the "spirit of the law"
that goes beyond legal compliance seems to pose rule of law problems, as
defined above, in the sense of government needing to govern by known rules
In order to satisfy this requirement it may be, however, that precision is not
essential. There can be some room for discretion without breaching the re-
quirements of the rule of law. Philip Pettit (an important influence on John
Braithwaite)," for example, argues that the best sort of law may have to leave
some discretion in the hands of governments agents, but measures are then
needed to ensure that those agents cannot act on a wholly arbitrary basis.'00
If this discretion is guided by principles embodied in the law itself, it may
be that the discretion given is no greater than under a system of detailed
rules. Detailed and prescriptive legislation in the UK does not appear to have
removed the need for extensive extra-statutory guidance. In addition, these
detailed rules they often give rise to game playing and even absurdities be-
cause of unintended conflicts and errors. In such a situation courts may be
required to contort language to come to a sensible solution or they may re-
fuse to do that as being beyond their remit and so the matter has to go back
to the legislature to deal with by yet further complex legislation. Such prob-
lems seem less rather than more likely to arise in legislation based on princi-
ples.'0
Thus a plea for matters to be governed by legislation is not a plea for a re-
turn to literal interpretation of detailed rules but for a statutory framework
capable of sensible application in controlling discretion. This comes down to
drafting good legislation that governs any necessary areas of discretion
Reasons to Smile", New York Times (25 March 2011) Al; for a response from GE, see GE
Reports, GE and Taxes (28 March 2011), online: <http://www.gereports.com>.
9 See John Braithwaite & Philip Pettit, NotJust Deserts: A Republican Theory ofCriminal
justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
100 Pettit, supra note 11 at 174-75. On the need for mechanisms to control revenue discre-
tion under the existing UK system, see Judith Freedman & John Vella, "HMRC'S Man-
agement of the UK Tax System: the Boundaries of Legitimate Discretion"in Christopher
Evans, Judith Freedman & Richard Krever, eds, TheDelicateBalance: Tax Discretion and
the Rule ofLaw (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2011).
'o' See Freedman, "Improving", supra note 12.
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through principles that can be overseen by the courts, rather than leaving
matters entirely to extra-statutory regulation that cannot be supervised in
this way. In this way the spirit of the law and the legislation can become close
to the same thing and there is no need for revenue authorities to persuade
taxpayers to comply in a way that goes beyond the law.
Not only can responsive regulation in the large business context raise
questions about interpretation of the law, but to an extent it gives the au-
thorities discretion as to when and how to apply the law. It suggests that en-
forcement should be based not purely on the severity of any non-compliance
but also on the willingness to comply with the regulator. Potentially this
could result in the revenue authority applying its powers in an arbitrary way
depending on its relationship with a taxpayer rather than by reference to a
scale set out by way of a legal framework. Critics such as Yuengo 2 argue that
this may not result in a fair and proportionate response.
Most tax systems recognize the need for the tax authority to have some
discretion not to enforce tax law in every case if, for example, it would be
inefficient to do so, and the UK is no exception."" The question is how this
discretion should be controlled and not be permitted to become a power for
the revenue authority to make tax law. This would be unacceptable to tax-
payers as a whole and therefore counter-productive. In the context of the
example in Part II of the relationship with large business, this shows the im-
portance of clear published guidance on risk rating and on the actions
HMRC will take in any given situation."o It may also argue for some kind of
appeal mechanism, perhaps to an administrative organization rather than a
court, if there is disagreement over the way the relationship is managed. This
may be a more difficult issue than interpretation, given that ultimately inter-
pretation issues can always be taken to the courts but complaints about the
102 Yeung, supra note 5.
103 Evans, Freedman & Krever, supra note 100.
104 See HMRC, HMRC Litigation and Settlements Strategy, online: <http://www
.hmrc.gov.uk> (this may be as much for the protection of HMRC as it is for the taxpayer,
for example in the context of settlements with large business it is important that HMRC
has a published Settlements Strategy and can show it has followed its own procedure);
National Audit Office, supra note 98.
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operation of the management discretion may have no formal procedure avail-
able, although there may be administrative procedures in existence for this
purpose.'
B. RISK RATING AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION
As described in Part III above, taxpayers maybe risk rated and treated differ-
ently depending on where they fall on the risk scale. In some ways this is en-
tirely consistent with responsive regulation. There is an assessment of the
taxpayer's willingness to comply. A compliant taxpayer is rated as being low
risk and therefore not to be subjected to a high level of audit, since that tax-
payer is trusted to self-regulate, to some extent. Initially this sits well with the
pyramid of compliance, but it could become static, non-responsive, and
backward looking if not regularly reviewed and this would then be far from
responsive. It could also lead to under-deterrence of low level risk activity,
which might be inefficient in the long run.0 6 This might also reduce confi-
dence in the fairness of the administration of the tax system, to the ultimate
detriment of compliance by the majority. In his Fasken lecture, John
Braithwaite explains that
[t]he pyramid is not about specifying in advance what are the types of mat-
ters that should be dealt with at the base of the pyramid, which are the more
serious ones that should be in the middle and which are the most egregious
ones for the peak of the pyramid. Even with the most serious matters... we
stick with the presumption that it is better to start with a dialogue at the base
of the pyramid.10 7
This does give rule of law problems with proportionality and fairness be-
tween taxpayers, as touched upon above. However, provided taxpayers are
being open and transparent about transactions which they believe are within
the statute but where there may be some uncertainty, it would suggest that
the startingpoint should continue to be a low-risk relationship. This should
be so even if HMRC takes the view that there might be tax avoidance which
1o5 Evans, Freedman & Krever supra note 101.
106 See Black, "Emergence", supra note 40 at 512; Baldwin & Black, supra note 40 at 66.
107 Braithwaite, "Essence", supra note 1.
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the courts would strike down or which is not in accordance with HMRC's
view of the intention of Parliament.
Too rapid an escalation up the pyramid might jeopardize the responsive-
ness of the risk-rating system and this analysis does seem consistent with
some of the comments in the BTF minutes.'
Some anecdotal comments on the risk-rating of large companies also
chime with comments made by Baldwin and Black that risk-based frame-
works may focus resources in high risk areas at the expense of lower risk ar-
eas. In time, unless supplemented by other programs, this could lead to un-
der-deterrence of low-level risk activity and "substitute widely spread risks for
lower numbers of larger risks".'09 In the context of the example discussed in
Part III, once rated as low risk, companies might feel they can get away with
more "innovative interpretations" for a period of three years until the next
business risk review is due."o No doubt this is a possibility of which CRMs
will be well aware and in any event it would only work once.
The exchanges around risk rating of large business in the UK for tax pur-
poses underline the potential difficulties with using responsive regulation
combined with risk rating in this area. At the same time they also bear out
the value of regulatory conversations as a mechanism for controlling this
process and working towards a good balance."' The BTF is able to make its
criticism openly and has achieved a clarification of the TCRM as shown in
Part II above, although some potentially contentious language is still used.
HMRC has noted the limitations on its powers in the notes accompanying
the Code of Practice on Taxation for Banks but without changing course on
the basic contents of the Code. It seems likely that the conversation will need
to be an on-going process and that the tension between the different objec-
tives of risk-rating will need to be kept in mind.
It is not only the relationship between HMRC and the taxpayers in ques-
tion that need to be taken into account in this process. A regulatory conver-
108 HMRC, supra note 59.
1'0 Baldwin & Black, supra note 40 at 67.
"o TCRM3410, supra note 55; Freedman, Loomer &Vella, "New Approaches", supra note
51.
" Black, Rules, supra note 9.
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sation that is seen as becoming too restricted to the parties themselves and
too "friendly" will not help tax compliance more generally and will open up
business and the tax authority to criticism, as described above."' In its own
TCRM available on-line until the April revision, HMRC apparently felt they
should address concerns about the treatment of low risk taxpayers in the fre-
quently asked questions section of the TCRM (which, it should be remem-
bered, is largely addressing the concerns of its own staff).
The question posed was "Isn't this contrary to HMRC's responsibility to
collect the right amount of tax from the largest taxpayers in the UK?" The
answer given:
No. We expect Low Risk customers to have extensive tax compliance proce-
dures and processes, well qualified staff or advisers, a relatively conservative
strategy towards tax filing and mitigation positions, be committed to open
disclosure of potential risks and adopt a collaborative approach to resolving
them.
We need to deploy our best technical skills fully where this kind of relation-
ship does not exist and experience has shown that the amount of tax recov-
ered by compliance interventions across this customer group represents a
very small proportion of LBS compliance yield. The resource we and our
customers would otherwise spend on such compliance interventions is better
spent improving compliance elsewhere." 3
This is a sensible defence of the resource allocation mechanism being
used, but the very fact that the question is being asked suggests that concerns
about equity as between taxpayers have been raised. Thus, where risk rating
is used as a device to save administrative costs and prevent the need for regu-
lar audits there is a danger that, whilst it may be very efficient, it is a tool that
needs to be handled with care. Treating taxpayers differently depending on
their profile enables tax authorities to use their limited resources efficiently
but also has the potential to result in unfair treatment for one taxpayer in
relation to others. The line between good management and an unfair or dis-
proportionate use of this tool is a thin one. As pointed out by Baldwin and
"2 Supra note 99.
u1 HMRC, TCRM 1400 annex L, accessed 19/1/2011, no longer available online but on
file with author.
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Black, the criteria used may not be purely technical but in fact may be con-
tentious. Although apparently an administrative device, this could hide im-
portant policy issues and make scrutiny and accountability in relation to
those issues difficult.'1 4 There could be tension between efficiency and con-
stitutional values unless the discretion available to revenue authorities is used
with great care.
V. CONCLUSION
The discussion in this article of the application of responsive regulation and
risk-rating to a particular area of tax administration, large business compli-
ance, shows that John Braithwaite's ideas have great value in tax administra-
tion provided they are handled with care and not pushed too far. Care has to
be taken, however, not to extend expectations of taxpayers beyond legal re-
quirements.
If there is a perception that taxpayers are being required to go beyond the
law in their compliance, the approach could become counter-productive. In
addition, the motivation of responsive regulation needs to be clear. If the aim
is to encourage transparency and self-regulation, it may be better and clearer
to focus on that without also trying to prevent taxpayers from adopting argu-
able interpretations of the law with which the revenue authorities disagree.
This might get in the way of encouraging more important types of co-
operation, such as full real time disclosure. Contentious legal issues could be
left to legal decision, rather than risk rating. Subject to this, a co-operative
and trusting environment can be efficient and positive in its results for all
concerned.
This is not an argument for the literal application of rigid, detailed legis-
lative rules; far from it. Instead it is argued that good legislation based on
principles would amount to an improved method of conveying and ascer-
taining parliamentary intention in the tax arena and would provide a better
framework for controlling the proper use of discretion by revenue authori-
ties. Combined with responsive regulation, sensitively applied, and good
supporting mechanisms for scrutinizing and controlling discretion, this
would lead to a sensible and workable basic framework for managing the
114 Baldwin & Black, supra note 40 at 67.
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inevitable uncertainties of taxation in a complex world. Further assistance
can be provided by having extensive consultation and other regulatory con-
versations, but these conversations must include all groups and not only par-
ties involved in particular areas if they are to inspire confidence in the public.
It is not, however, for the public or the media or, for that matter, the revenue
authority to decide how much tax is payable, but for the legislature, having
been informed by public debate and in the terms it has communicated to the
courts. Once legislation is in place that should be enforced equally in relation
to all taxpayers but it is reasonable for audit and enforcement resources to be
allocated based on risk within that framework. Juggling all these factors will
require constant vigilance but if the balls can all be held in the air at once this
could give an outcome which would be at least satisfactory. In the complex
world of large corporate taxation, this would be a good result.
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